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Abstract
This paper aims at providing an explanation of the observed espresso
price dispersion across major Italian cities. The empirical evidence
suggests a positive relationships between the average espresso price
in a city and the number of co¤ee shops (normalized for the adult
population) operating in that city. This nding is shown to be robust
after controlling for GDP per capita and consumersprice index. We
provide an interpretation of the empirical ndings relying on a model
of price competition delivering a continuum of Nash equilibria, where
rms adjust the mark-up to o¤set the negative e¤ect of any increase
in their number.
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JEL Classi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1 Introduction
For the average Italian adult, drinking an espresso is not only a ritual, but
it is most often a repeated ritual during the day. According to anecdotical
evidence, espresso is the second most drunk beverage in Italy (water being
rst), dozens million cups being consumed daily.
A discerning consumer travelling from Northern to Southern Italian cities
would probably notice a non-negligible fall in espresso prices. Actually, in
major Italian cities espresso cups are priced in bars very similarly within
cities and very di¤erently across cities.1 For instance, in 2001 the average
price2 charged in Milano was 0.78 euros, it declines to 0.62 in Roma and even
more in Palermo, 0.56. In 2011, the last year in our sample, the dispersion
across cities did not change much as it ranged from 1.01 euros in Bologna to
0.79 in Roma and 0.71 in Bari.
Since the standard espresso drunk at the bar is a fairly homogeneous
good, except for location, broad price di¤erences look surprising. Moreover,
descriptives suggest a large variance in the average number of consumers per
bar across cities. In particular, it turns out that higher prices are associated
to lower number of clients (proxied by adult inhabitants) per bar. These
facts give rise to interesting questions: why prices are so high in some cities
and not in others? do consumers per bar play a role in explaining these large
1In what follows we refer to barto indicate a plethora of establishments selling co¤ee
(co¤ee shops, cafeterias, pubs. . . ), excluding restaurants. More details are provided in
Appendix A.1 describing the dataset.
2By average price we mean the price charged for a cup of single espresso drunk standing
at the counter. Unlike many other countries, this is the standard way Italians consume
espresso. Hence, the sample excludes the service surcharge applied by cafeterias to the
price of espresso when customers sit down.
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di¤erences in prices? High levels of price are compatible with several di¤er-
ent explanations. The rst and well known relies upon explicit collusion.3 A
second interpretation may be based on tacit collusion in a repeated game.
However, there are at least two characteristics of the espresso market that
are hardly compatible with the two above classical explanations. First, the
number of bars/rms is large in all cities. Second, in many cities demand is
seasonally uctuating because of touristsows and the discontinuous pres-
ence of students. Both factors are known as obstacles to implement and
sustain collusive agreements.
However, there is a third approach that does not need to invoke either
implicit or explicit collusion. Such an approach is based upon Dastidars
(1995, 2001) model of one-shot price competition with homogeneous goods
under convex costs. According to the Dastidar model a price equilibrium
outcome mimicking joint prot maximization may indeed emerge as a non-
cooperative equilibrium without repetition. We will show that our empirical
ndings t better Dastidars conclusion than the two traditional approaches
mentioned above. The empirical evidence suggests a positive relationships
between the average espresso price in a city and the number of bars, or
conversely, higher prices tend to prevail in cities with a lower number of
clients per bar, which is consistent with the comparative statics properties
of Dastidars model.
We perform a simple empirical analysis on the distribution of espresso
prices in the 20 Italian regional capitals, a sample including the most popu-
lated Italian cities, between 2001 and 2011. A glance to the basic descriptive
3Italian bars are usually members of professional associations. It is not rare for these
associations to suggest "focal" price levels for espresso. This could be a factor facilitating
collusion or, at least, coordination of price levels across bars.
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statistics reveals a negative correlation between espresso prices and the av-
erage number of customers per bar. For instance, in 2011, the upper limit
of one euro is the price approached when the number of clients falls below
400. Using data available for four years (2001, 2005, 2009, 2011) within the
period, we estimate a Linear Probability Model Fixed E¤ects Regression and
show that increasing the average number of customers per bar (or decreasing
the number of bars with respect to the population) has a negative and sig-
nicant impact on espresso price. The result is obtained controlling for both
GDP per capita and city price indices. This evidence is then rationalized
within Dastidars model, by means of some comparative statics.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we illustrate the statistical
evidence and develop our simple empirical analysis. The detailed description
of data set is in the Appendix. Section 3 illustrates how the basic empirical
ndings may be derived within Dastidar model of price competition. Section
4 concludes by bridging the empirical analysis and theoretical predictions.
2 Empirical analysis
2.1 Data
We aim to perform an empirical analysis on the distribution of espresso
prices in Italy. The lack of data available on the sector studied constitutes
an important constraint to our analysis. In Appendix A.1 we provide a
detailed account of how we constructed the sample. Generally, our analysis
focuses on the capital cities of the 20 Italian regions in the years 2001, 2005,
2009 and 2011, for a total of about 80 observations. The espresso prices are
collected by Italian National Institute of Statistics (henceforth ISTAT). For
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each city, we also have information about the number of bars, the total adult
population,4 the consumers price index (ISTAT) and the GDP per capita
(Eurostat). From the previous sources, we compute the average number of
clients per bar in each city. The descriptives of the sample are summarized
in Table 1.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Co¤ee Price 78 0:78075 0:11517 0:56 1:012
Clients per bar 80 537:777 188:702 294:529 1239:579
GDP per capita 80 25400 7035:102 13800 46600
Price Index 77 113:6266 9:4284 101:8 130:9
2.2 Empirical results
Observing the raw data we detect the presence of a negative relationship
between the price of the espresso and the average number of clients per bar.
The scatter plot of clients per bar and espresso prices displays a downward
pattern that approaches the average price of 1 euro when clients per bar are
less than 400. The relationship is conrmed by the correlation coe¢ cient of
 0:6292.
4The total adult population is o¢ cially dened by ISTAT as residents of 15 years of
age or above.
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Fig. 1 Clients per bar and espresso prices.
The previous descriptive evidence is not su¢ cient to explain the observed
pattern of espresso prices in Italy. For a better understanding of the price
dispersion, we need at least to control for a number of other factors. In par-
ticular, price dispersion is likely to be explained by variables like citiesGDP
per capita and general consumersprice indices. Common sense would sug-
gest that richer cities should experience higher price levels, including higher
espresso prices.5
Given the panel structure of our dataset, we estimate a Linear Probability
Model with Fixed E¤ects using the following specication:
Espresso priceit = it + Clientsit + GDPpc+ PriceIndexit + "it (1)
where t indicates the year, i the city and it represents the city xed e¤ects.
For ease of interpretation of the following results, the variable Clients is
measured in hundred clients per bar and GDPpc in thousands of euros.
5Intuition may suggest that richer areas entail higher espresso prices. However, this
maybe misleading: within the same city, for example Bologna, espresso prices are basically
at across districts, despite very large di¤erences in income per capita across city districts
(Bologna City Council, 2014).
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Table 2 presents our main results.
Table 2. Espresso price dispersion: a linear probability model
Espresso price
Clients  0:06275***
(0:01333)
GDPpc 0:020878***
(0:006672)
Price Index  0:0003536
(0:0003424)
Const 0:618089**
(0:239975)
R2 0:4916
Obs 75
First and fairly surprisingly, city consumersprice levels are not statis-
tically signicant in explaining espresso prices.6 Whereas we could a priori
think that the price index may capture, for example, the impact of tourism
on the price of an espresso cup, our regression analysis suggests instead no
role for this regressor. Second, the GDP per capita has a statistically sig-
nicant role in explaining the espresso price dispersion. A thousand euros
increase in the GDP per capita has an estimated positive impact of 2 cents
on the price of a cup. Last but not least, controlling for xed e¤ects, evidence
shows that increasing the average number of clients per bar has a signicant
and negative e¤ect on the price of espresso. In particular, an extra hundred
clients per each bar is estimated to lead to an average decrease of 6.2 cents in
6We included both GDP per capita and consumersprice levels among the regressors
as they are not highly collinear.
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the price of espresso.7 The latter nding is rather counterintuitive. There are
two ways of thinking about it: either increasing demand per bar yields a fall
in espresso prices or increasing the number of sellers for a given population
of consumers increases espresso prices. This nding calls for a theoretical
investigation.
3 A suggested interpretation
To rationalize our empirical ndings, we rely upon Dastidar (1995). His
model is important for the analysis of market competition under price-setting
behavior because it allows proving the existence of a continuum of pure-
strategy Nash equilibria in the price space under regular demand and convex
variable costs. We shall focus on a linear-quadratic version of his original
model.
The market is supplied by a population of n  1 identical rms. The
product is homogeneous and its demand function is p = a   Q; where Q =
ni=1qi is aggregate output p is price and a is a positive parameter proxying
the size of the market. All rms produce with the same technology, to which
a cost function Ci = bqi+cq2i =2 is associated, where c is a positive parameter,
and b 2 [0; a). The prot function of rm i is then
i =

p  b  cqi
2

qi =

a  qi  Q i   b  cqi
2

qi (2)
where Q i = j 6=iqj.
The non-cooperative one-shot game takes place under complete, symmet-
ric and imperfect information. The solution concept is the Nash equilibrium,
which here involves all rms setting the same price p 2 [pavc; pu] : At the
7Appendix A.2 provides a robustness check of our conclusions.
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lower bound pavc; equilibrium price equals average variable costs, so that
rms are indi¤erent between producing or not. At the upper bound pu; the
equilibrium price is such that rms would be indi¤erent between playing pu
or marginally undercutting it in order to capture the entire market demand.
The continuum of price equilibria is8
pBN =
ac+ 2b (n  )
c+ 2 (n  ) (3)
where BN stands for Bertrand-Nash, and  is a parameter whose range is
 2 [0; n2= (1 + n)] : In particular:
 if  = 0; the equilibrium price equals average variable cost;
 at  = n=2; marginal cost pricing obtains;
 if  = n2= (1 + n) ; pBN reaches the highest level above which under-
cutting takes place.
Taking the partial derivatives of (3) w.r.t. n (treated as a continuous
variable) and , we get
@pBN
@n
=   2 (a  b) c
[c+ 2 (n  )]2 < 0 (4)
@pBN
@
=  @p
BN
@n
=
2 (a  b) c
[c+ 2 (n  )]2 > 0 (5)
The partial derivative (4) tells that, in the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, an
increase in the number of rms unambiguously decrease market price. Partial
derivative (5) reveals that the equilibrium price increases with  at the same
rate with which price decreases w.r.t. the number of rms. Therefore, the
8See Dastidar (1995, pp. 27-28), Gori et al. (2014, pp. 373-75) and Delbono and
Lambertini (2015).
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isoprice curve in the space (n; ) is a straight line increasing at 45. This
amounts to saying that the price-setting rms may compensate the negative
e¤ect of an increase in their number by increasing : If the latter increases
more than proportionately w.r.t. n, the equilibrium price increases.
4 Bridging evidence and theory
In our context, the assumption of cost convexity appears a sound one. Indeed,
according to a recent professional association report (FIPE, 2013), in the
average Italian bar, labor costs account for about 60% of the total espresso
cost, whereas raw co¤ee weights 22% and rents and other costs account for
18%. Hence, the incidence of labor costs makes the hypothesis of convex
variable costs plausible. Moreover, di¤erent rents likely account for the midl
dispersion of espresso prices within each city.
Our linear probability model with xed e¤ects explains espresso prices
using three variables: GDP per capita, consumersprice level and the average
number of clients per bar. As for the GDP, it clearly a¤ects positively the
espresso price. In our formulation of Dastidars model, GDP is proxied by
parameter a; any increase in which obviously causes an increase in equilibrium
price. The e¤ect of a change in the consumers price level, which could
perhaps be captured by a variation in the cost parameters b and c appearing
in the cost function, is not statistically signicant.
Finally, notice that a decrease in the average number of clients per bar
is equivalent to an increase in the number of bars for any given size of con-
sumerspopulation. The empirical nding is that an increase in the number
of bars (rms) signicantly increases espresso prices. The theoretical coun-
terpart of this nding is that rms react to the pro-competitive impact of an
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increase in their population by drifting away from both average and marginal
cost pricing through . If rms overreact to a decrease in industry concen-
tration by increasing  more than proportionally, then price increases.
Our rationalization of what happens in Italian cities can then be sum-
marized as follows. In those cities in which the number of bars is large with
respect to the population of customers, or conversely the average number of
clients per bar is small, espresso prices tend to be high as rms/bars behave
in a way consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model.
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A Appendix
A.1 Construction of the dataset
The lack of data on bars selling espresso constitutes a serious obstacle to
the statistical analysis in this study. We outline here the strategy adopted
to construct a workable dataset. The units of analysis are the 20 regional
capital cities of Italy. The following are the original data sources available.
ISTAT has data about the price of espresso but these are available only for
years 2005 and 2009. Data from the Italian Census, also published by ISTAT,
provide us with the number of eating and drinking establishments in each
city for years 2001 and 2011. For year 2011 the exact number of bars is
also available. Data on GDP per capita at current prices (Eurostat)9 and
on the ConsumersPrice Index and the Total Adult Population (ISTAT) are
available for all the years in the study.
On the basis of these original sources, we do two exercises. First, we
need to estimate the number of bars. For 2001 we use the proportion of
9Eurostat provides data on GDP at province levels. In the Eurostat taxonomy, the
Italian provinces correspond to NUTS3.
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bar over the total number of eating and drinking establishments in 2011.
For the remaining years, 2005 and 2009, we calculate the number of bars
by interpolating the original data on establishments in 2001 and 2011 and
then using again the 2011 proportion to estimate the number of bars in those
years. The underlying assumption is that the proportion of bars over the total
number of establishments has not changed throughout the 2001-2011 period.
In other words, the data-generation process relies upon the conjecture that
the number of bars were not subject to any technological, demand or supply
shock in the ten years time span considered: given the characteristics of
the sector (very homogeneous product, very low technology, very customary
clients) our conjecture and the resulting constant rate appears justied.
Second, we need to estimate the price of espresso for years 2001 and
2011. A very similar reasoning was adopted. Given the original 2005 and
2009 data, we interpolate them linearly to calculate the estimated espresso
prices for years 2001 and 2011.
A.2 Robustness checks
In the light of the di¢ culties faced in constructing the dataset for the analysis,
it is extremely important to check the robustness of them. To do so, in this
section we test two alternative specications. The rst specication includes
only the years for which we have original information on the number of eating
and drinking establishments, i.e. 2001 and 2011. The second specication
includes only the years for which original data on espresso prices are available,
i.e. 2005 and 2009.
Table A.1 reports the results for these two specications in columns (1)
and (2) respectively. Column (1) shows that our results are extremely robust
to the rst of our new, reduced specications.
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Table A1. Espresso price: robustness checks
(1) (2)
Clients  0:061702*** 0:005125
(0:013277) (0:021477)
GDPpc 0:022716***  0:034596
(0:006977) (0:0050634)
PriceIndex  0:000632 0:009313***
(0:000342) (0:001617)
Const 0:599450**  0:264686
(0:213104) (0:276885)
2001-2011 only 2005-2009 only
R2 0:4916 0:0058
Obs 38 37
The signs and signicance are comparable and even the magnitude of the
e¤ects is almost una¤ected. The results are less encouraging when focus-
ing on Column (2). In that specication, covering years 2005 and 2009, the
number of clients per bar has a positive e¤ect on espresso prices. The e¤ect,
however, has a very small magnitude and it is not statistically signicant
(p-value' 0:81). GDP per capita is also not signicant and all the e¤ects
seem to be captured by the consumersprice level, that is highly signicant.
A look at the descriptives for years 2005 and 2009, however, seems to con-
rm the evidence provided in the main text. Figure 2 shows a weaker but
negative relationship between the price of espresso and the clients per bar.
On top of that the correlation coe¢ cient between these two variables is still
 0:6262. The regression results in (2), instead, might be a¤ected by the
reduced number of observations when focusing only on two years.
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Fig. 2 Clients per bar and espresso prices, 2005-2009.
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